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QUESTION PRESENTED
The qualified immunity defense insulates federal
and state officials from monetary damages unless
they have violated clearly established rights. To
determine whether a right is “clearly established,”
courts compare the facts at issue to the legal analysis
of an official’s actions in factually similar scenarios.
Because the Court has not articulated a single
approach, the circuits employ conflicting standards
over the degree of similarity required and
substantially disagree over which sources of
authority are used to show that the law is clearly
established.
The question presented is:
Whether a right is clearly established in a case
with a novel fact pattern when a consensus of several
circuits’ precedents have recognized the right at a
level of specificity such that any further distinction
lacks legal significance.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner is Richard Ortega, who was the
plaintiff and appellant below.
Respondents, who were defendants in the district
court and appellees in the court of appeals are Mark
Bolton,
William
Skaggs,
Lori
Eppler,
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government
(collectively “Metro Respondents”), and John T.
Cloyd, an Immigrations & Customs Enforcement
(ICE) agent.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
_________
No. 13-___
_________

RICHARD ORTEGA,
Petitioner,

v.
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ET AL.,
Respondents.
_________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
_________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_________
Petitioner Richard Ortega respectfully petitions
this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Sixth Circuit is reported at
737 F.3d 435 and reproduced at page 1a of the
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appendix to this petition (“App.”). The unpublished
order of the District Court is reproduced at App. 18a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was entered on
December 10, 2013. App. 1a. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY & REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The text of relevant statutes and regulations are
set forth in the appendix to this petition. App. 29a.
INTRODUCTION
This case presents a question of extreme
importance on the nature of proof required to
establish that a right is clearly established. Nearly
thirty years ago, this Court recognized that the
“clearly established” inquiry turns on how
specifically a court articulates the rule at issue.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
The Court expressed concern that the qualified
immunity doctrine would become meaningless if
rights were defined at improper levels of generality.
Id.
Fifteen years after Anderson, the Court provided
contradictory guidance as to how lower courts should
conduct the clearly established inquiry. In Hope v.
Pelzer, the Court held that a right could be generally
defined, contrary to the Court’s holding in Anderson
that a right must be specifically defined. 536 U.S.
730, 741 (2002) (citing United States v. Lanier, 520
U.S. 259 (1997)). More recently, the Court has
suggested that the appropriate level of specificity
falls somewhere between the two cases, but the
Court has not provided explicit guidance.
See
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Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011);
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004) (per
curiam). This doctrinal uncertainty has plagued
courts’ ability to consistently render the clearly
established analysis, among and within the circuits.
As the Fifth Circuit recently recognized, this Court’s
“admonition in al–Kidd that [lower courts] should
not define clearly established law at a high level of
generality sits in tension with its earlier statement
in Hope v. Pelzer that general statements of the law
are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear
warning, at least in a certain category of obvious
cases.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 373 (5th
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As a result of this tension, the circuits are
inexorably divided among myriad regimes on the
precedential weight of prior opinions based on their
nature, type, and circuit of origin. This leads to
substantial disuniformity; a right may be considered
clearly established in one circuit but not another
despite the exact same precedential profile. For
instance, whereas the facts of this case would very
likely lead to finding the officers in this case were not
entitled to qualified immunity under the Third,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ standards, the
Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits would likely
disagree.
The test adopted by the panel majority here,
according to Judge Keith’s dissent, “allows an officer
to blatantly violate the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of an American
citizen—so long as it was done in a manner that
neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has
directly opined on before—with impunity.” App. 16a.
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(Keith, J., dissenting). The Sixth Circuit committed
a fundamental error, the immediate effect of which
distorts this Court’s holdings and contravenes the
decisions of other circuits. Certiorari is warranted
for two main reasons.
First, the Sixth Circuit deepened a conflict
among the circuits, and incorrectly applied the
analysis regarding whether a right is clearly
established. The panel majority adopted a far-too
limited definition of the term “clearly established,”
defying the holdings of this Court and other circuits.
The panel majority contravened this Court’s
precedent when determining whether unlawfulness
was apparent by failing to evaluate whether the
factual circumstances of this case were contextually
similar to prior cases. This case highlights the
myriad differences among the circuits in how they
determine whether a right is clearly established.
They differ on what types of authorities may be used
to prove a right is clearly established, and they differ
on the level of factual similarity required between
cases to prove a right is clearly established. Only
this Court’s guidance can remedy these inconsistent
regimes.
Second, this case presents an issue of extreme
importance.
Qualified immunity is asserted in
nearly every case involving a claim against a
government official in his or her individual capacity
for damages. Properly applying this standard is of
exceptional importance because the approach that a
court takes in articulating and assessing whether the
law is clearly established is often outcomedeterminative. Absent this Court’s direct guidance,
lower courts will continue to disparately assess
qualified
immunity,
generating
avoidable
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uncertainty.
Review is also warranted because
circuit and district courts routinely struggle with
applying the doctrine.
Non-uniform qualified
immunity standards lead to unjust results, and
inconsistent standards hamper certainty and
predictability for litigants, government officials, and
the courts.
For these reasons and those that follow, the
Court should grant the petition and reverse the
judgment below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Factual Background. A Kentucky court sentenced
Petitioner Richard Ortega, a third generation United
States citizen, to fourteen days of home confinement
after his conviction for driving under the influence.
App. 3a. Individuals participating in Kentucky’s
home confinement program are required to wear an
electronic monitoring device at all times, and must
satisfy certain agreed upon conditions to remain in
the program. App. 3; see also App. 35a. Under his
term of home confinement, Ortega was allowed to go
to work, to medical appointments, and to church if he
received prior approval. App. 3a. It is undisputed
that, at all times, Ortega complied with the
requirements of the home confinement program and
the home confinement agreement he had signed.
While Ortega was under home confinement, ICE
agent John Cloyd issued an immigration detainer
naming Ortega as a suspected illegal alien. App. 3a.
ICE purportedly served the detainer because Ortega
had a similar name and birthdate to an illegal alien
who had previously been deported. App. 3a.
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After receiving the detainer, the local corrections
department removed Ortega from home confinement
and took him to jail. App. 3a-4a. When the
authorities arrived to remove Ortega, they refused to
allow him to show them any forms of identification or
proof of his United States citizenship. They refused
to allow him to produce his driver’s license or Social
Security card. App. 4a; see also App. 13a. The
corrections department then took Ortega to jail,
affording him no process whatsoever. See App. 4a;
13a. Ortega remained there for four days until the
corrections officials discovered that Ortega was, as
he claimed, a United States citizen. App. 3a.
Proceedings Below.
Ortega sued Cloyd, the
Louisville Department of Corrections, and the
officers who jailed him, claiming that removal from
home confinement to institutional confinement
without any warrant or process violated the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. App. 4. He
brought a Bivens claim against ICE agent Cloyd for
violating his right to be free from unreasonable
seizures and his right to due process, based on
Cloyd’s issuance of an unlawful ICE detainer. App.
4. He also brought § 1983 claims against the local
corrections officials for violating his right to be free
from unreasonable seizure and his right to due
process of law, based on removing him from home
confinement and taking him to jail. App. 4.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss based on qualified immunity. App. 19a.
Ortega appealed the decision, arguing there is a
liberty interest in remaining in non-institutional
confinement and that some process is required to be
removed from non-institutional confinement and
placed in jail or prison. App. 4a-5a. Ortega cited a
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case from the Seventh Circuit which held, on very
similar facts, that there is a liberty interest in home
confinement once it has been ordered.
Br. of
Appellant at 16, Ortega v. United States Immigration
& Customs Enforcement, et al., (No. 12-6608).
Additionally, he cited cases from the First, Second,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits that held there is a
liberty interest in remaining in other noninstitutional forms of confinement. Id. at 15-16. He
argued these precedents were based on this Court’s
precedents that stated there is a fundamental
difference between being confined at home and being
confined to an institution. Id. at 18-19.
The Sixth Circuit agreed there is a liberty
interest in remaining in home confinement once
ordered. App. 6a-8a. It held the change between
home confinement and institutional confinement was
a “sufficiently severe change in conditions to
implicate due process.” App. 7a.
The panel majority held, though, that this right
was not clearly established. App. 8a-10a. The court
ruled that the myriad precedents it relied on to
recognize the right were not sufficient to clearly
establish the right. App. 10a. The court declined to
give weight to analogous cases with similar facts,
saying that they were not similar enough to establish
the right. See App. 9a-10a.
Judge Keith dissented, finding Ortega’s liberty
interest in home confinement clearly established.
App. 10. Judge Keith found Ortega’s claims to be
based on “core constitutional principles.” App. 14a.
He also considered the Supreme Court precedent and
analogous cases to be relevant and decisive. App.
15a. He wrote that “[a]t a minimum, those decisions
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firmly establish that an individual serving a
sentence outside of prison is entitled to some
minimum amount of process before being arrested
and taken to jail.” App. 15a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEEPENED A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS REGARDING HOW TO PROVE THAT A RIGHT IS
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED

Qualified immunity affords government officials
immunity from civil damages unless (1) “the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right” and
(2) the right “was clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S.
Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). This petition focuses solely on
the second inquiry. This Court explained that “the
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at
640. The circuits are divided on how to determine
the clarity of a right’s contours in at least two ways.
First, they are divided on what sources of
authority clearly establish a right. This Court has
not expressly stated what authority makes a right
clearly established, although it has suggested
support for different standards. Compare al-Kidd,
131 S. Ct. at 2083-84 (supporting a narrow
standard), with Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646
(supporting a broad standard by recognizing that
qualified immunity protects officials from personal
liability “as long as their actions are reasonable in
the light of current American law”).
Second, when looking to the appropriate
authority, a court must determine whether
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sufficiently comparable situations exist because, “in
light of pre-existing law[,] the unlawfulness [of the
government action] must be apparent.” Anderson,
483 U.S. at 640. This Court later clarified, however,
that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct
violates clearly established law even in novel factual
circumstances.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. In other
words, courts must look beyond the exact factual
circumstances of the previously recognized right. See
id. The circuits’ approaches to novel fact patterns
differ measurably.
A. The Circuits Employ Significantly
Different Standards Regarding What
Sources
of
Authority
Clearly
Establish A Right
1. Broad Standards
The Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
employ the broadest standards.
The Ninth Circuit first looks to Supreme Court
and Ninth Circuit precedent. Boyd v. Benton Cnty.,
374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004). If no binding
precedent exists, the Ninth Circuit considers
available “decisional law” from sister circuits, federal
district courts, and state courts. Drummond v. City
of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir.
1995)). If no binding or on-point case law exists, the
court will determine the likelihood of the Supreme
Court or the Ninth Circuit reaching the same result
by comparing the legal analysis of sister circuits with
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in related, but factually
distinct scenarios. Boyd, 374 F.3d at 781 (citing
Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514-15 (1985)).
The Ninth Circuit stated that it is not necessary “to
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find closely analogous case law to show that a right
is clearly established.” Bryan v. McPherson, 630
F.3d 805, 833 (9th Cir. 2010). Finally, the court
allows the use of unpublished dispositions to
establish a right. McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536,
1555 n.28 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Seventh Circuit employs a standard that is
equally broad. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit first looks to see whether the Supreme Court
or the Seventh Circuit has issued “controlling
precedent.” Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d
770, 781 (7th Cir. 2010). If such precedent cannot be
found, the Seventh Circuit will “broaden [its] survey
to include all relevant case law in order to determine
whether there was such a clear trend in the case law
that [the Seventh Circuit] can say with fair
assurance that the recognition of the right by a
controlling precedent was merely a question of time.”
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d
758, 766 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Eighth Circuit has explicitly embraced the
“broad view of the concept of clearly established law.”
Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001).
Absent binding Supreme Court or Eighth Circuit
precedent, the Eighth Circuit “look[s] to all available
decisional law, including decisions from other courts,
federal and state.” Id.
The Third Circuit is somewhat inconsistent. Its
opinions show a broad use of available precedent to
determine whether a right is clearly established.
See, e.g., Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205,
211 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (“If the unlawfulness of the
defendant’s conduct would have been apparent to a
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reasonable official based on the current state of the
law, it is not necessary that there be binding
precedent from this circuit so advising.”); Rivas v.
City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 198-200 (3d Cir. 2004)
(taking into account a Third Circuit case and two
Seventh Circuit cases in declaring that the law was
clearly established). Federal district court opinions
can also help clearly establish a right in the Third
Circuit. Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 193 n.7
(3d Cir. 2006).
2. Narrow Standards
The Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits
implement a narrow standard for determining
clearly established law.
The Eleventh Circuit articulated that “only
binding precedent can clearly establish a right for
qualified immunity purposes.” Gilmore v. Hodges,
738 F.3d 266, 279 (11th Cir. 2013). Thus, a right can
only be clearly established by the Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the
relevant state. See id.
The Fourth Circuit similarly confines the
analysis of precedent to the law of the relevant
jurisdiction. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d
107, 124 (4th Cir. 2013); Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999)
(“[C]ourts in this circuit [ordinarily] need not look
beyond the decisions of the Supreme Court, this
court of appeals, and the highest court of the state in
which the case arose.”) (alteration in original and
internal quotation marks omitted). The Second
Circuit also uses a narrow standard but frames the
analysis differently. The Second Circuit determines
whether the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit
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“had affirmed the existence of the right.” Townes v.
City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1999).
In the absence of binding precedent, the Second
Circuit determines whether the state of the law was
sufficient to put a reasonable government official
within the Second Circuit on notice of the
constitutional right.
See Gonzalez v. City of
Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2013); see
also Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 903 (2d
Cir. 1998) (“The question is not what a lawyer would
learn or intuit from researching case law, but what a
reasonable person in a defendant’s position should
know about the constitutionality of the conduct.”).
Additionally, federal district court opinions cannot
clearly establish a right. Hawkins v. Steingut, 829
F.2d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1987).
Unsurprisingly, the Second, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits do not allow unpublished opinions
to contribute to their determinations. See, e.g.,
Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 202 (2d Cir. 2001);
Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1996);
Gilmore, 738 F.3d at 279.
3. Semi-Narrow Standards
The First, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits use
standards between broad and narrow.
For a right to be clearly established in the Tenth
Circuit, “there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts must have
found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.”
Schwartz v. Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 587-88 (10th Cir.
2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Walker v. City of
Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006)).
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The Fifth Circuit uses a similar standard,
although it narrows the scope of on-point authority.
A right is clearly established if the Fifth Circuit can
“point to a controlling authority—or a robust
consensus of persuasive authority—that defines the
contours of the right in question with a high degree
of particularity.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359,
371-72 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
footnote omitted).
The D.C. Circuit requires its own binding
precedent to clearly establish a right. Youngbey v.
March, 676 F.3d 1114, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In the
absence of controlling precedent, the D.C. Circuit
will consider whether persuasive authority has come
to a consensus on the matter. Id.
Although less explicit about the terms of its
analysis, the First Circuit also uses a semi-narrow
standard. The First Circuit recognizes a right as
clearly established if the Supreme Court or First
Circuit has issued on-point precedent, or if a “clear
consensus” has developed among the other circuits
regarding the right.
See Walden v. City of
Providence, 596 F.3d 38, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2010);
Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2005).
4. The Panel Applied
Standard in This Case

a

Narrow

The Sixth Circuit panel majority here applied an
unclear narrow standard. In his briefs, Ortega
established that the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits “recognized that being removed
from custodial confinement outside the prison system
and being placed in institutional confinement
triggered a constitutionally protected liberty
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interest,” which in turn required some amount of
process. Br. of Appellant at 16, Ortega v. United
States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, et al.,
(No. 12-6608); see also App. at 15a (Keith, J.,
dissenting). Yet the panel majority only considered
the law of two other circuits rather than the full
breadth of circuits Ortega put before the court.
Underscoring the point, the panel majority stated
that “Ortega points to three cases” and then
discussed only those cases, which were from two
other circuits and ignored the numerous other cases
in additional circuits that were also on point. App. at
9a-10a (majority opinion). The panel majority did
not state on what standard it excluded the other
cited authority from consideration.
B. The Circuits Employ Significantly
Different Standards on the Needed
Level
of
Factual
Similarity
to
Establish Apparent Unlawfulness
The circuits also articulate different analytical
frameworks for determining the apparent unlawfulness of official conduct in novel factual circumstances.
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have held that
the law can be clearly established in novel factual
circumstances, even without a body of specific case
law. The Eleventh Circuit allows broad principles to
control novel factual situations. Keating v. City of
Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 766 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that in novel cases a “broader, clearly established
principal” may control or in obvious cases that prior
case law may be unnecessary). The Fourth Circuit
likewise has held that case law need not address the
right in a “specific context before such right may be
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held ‘clearly established.’” Meyers v. Balt. Cnty., 713
F.3d 723, 734 (4th Cir. 2013).
The First, Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits
instead focus on a narrower notice-based analysis.
They evaluate the reasonableness of a government
official’s ability to recognize the unconstitutionality
of the actions at issue. Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d
716, 738 (8th Cir. 2012); Martinez-Rodriguez v.
Guevara, 597 F.3d 414, 419 (1st Cir. 2010); Estate of
Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 781 (7th Cir.
2010); Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 114-15 (2d Cir.
2005). Under these circuits’ analyses the law can be
clearly established even when there are notable
factual distinctions, if prior decisions give officials
reasonable warning of the unconstitutionality of
their actions. Estate of Escobedo, 600 F.3d at 781.
The Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits place more
emphasis on the specific facts of the case and the
ability of the official to apply established law. The
Third Circuit only considers “broad principles” in
“extraordinary cases,” and assesses “whether the
official should have related this established law to
the instant circumstance.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653
F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Burns v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 177 (3d Cir. 2011)). The
Tenth Circuit adopts a similar approach. See Gomes
v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[G]overnment officials [should] make ‘reasonable
applications of the prevailing law to their own
circumstances.” (quoting Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d
905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001)).
The Fifth Circuit,
however, requires a more fact-intensive analysis to
establish applicable precedent. Kinney v. Weaver,
367 F.3d 337, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2004).
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C. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle
for Clarifying the Proper Approach to
Determine Whether a Right Is Clearly
Established
This case stands at the intersection of what law
should be considered to determine whether a right is
clearly established both as it relates to the source of
the law and as it relates to the level of generality at
which the right is stated. There is tension between
the Court’s analyses in Hope, which declared “that
there need not be a case on point to overcome
qualified immunity,” and Brosseau, which denied
“qualified immunity based on the lack of a case on
point.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction
§ 8.6, at 555 (5th ed. 2007); see Hope, 536 U.S. 730;
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198-99.
With no clear
guidance from this Court, the circuits have created
widely divergent standards.
The circuits’ different standards vary so widely
that results are contrary even with similar facts. For
example, had Ortega’s case arisen in the Ninth
Circuit (broad standard) rather than the Sixth
Circuit (semi-narrow standard), the Ninth Circuit
would likely have considered the similar cases in the
First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
as clearly establishing the constitutional right. This
result stands in direct opposition to the Sixth
Circuit’s determination.
Similarly, the very narrow view of the right at
issue that the majority took—highlighted by Judge
Keith’s dissent—stands in contrast with several
circuits and this Court. The Court has repeatedly
explained
that
contextually
similar
factual
situations—not only “the very act in question”—can
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clearly establish a right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640;
see also Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v.
Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377-78 (2009); Hope, 536 U.S.
at 741; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 604 (1999).
Circuits have come to differing conclusions on what
this means.
In this case, the panel majority demanded nearly
identical facts by either not considering cases
involving contextually similar facts, or dismissing
such cases as insufficient. This was error. Ortega
pointed to multiple circuit holdings to clearly
establish his liberty interest in non-institutional
confinement. The Tenth Circuit found a liberty
interest in a pre-parole program, saying that there
was a “fundamental change in the kind of
confinement.” Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 566
(10th Cir. 1995). Additionally, the Second and
Eighth Circuits recognized a liberty interest in a
prison work release program that triggered due
process rights. Kim v. Hurston, 182 F.3d 113, 118-20
(2d Cir. 1999); Edwards v. Lockhart, 908 F.2d 299,
301-02 (8th Cir. 1990). The First Circuit, in a case
involving a home incarceration program, held that
“the Due Process Clause is particularly protective of
individuals participating in non-institutional forms
of confinement.” Gonzales-Fuentes v. Molina, 607
F.3d 864, 890 (1st Cir. 2010). Finally, on nearly
identical facts, the Seventh Circuit held that being
removed from home confinement and taken to jail is
a “sufficient reduction” in liberty to be subject to
some amount of due process. Paige v. Hudson, 341
F.3d 642, 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
The panel majority defined the issue as whether
there was a liberty interest in being left in home
confinement rather than being taken to jail. App. 4a.
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Under the standards espoused by some circuits—
such as the Fourth and the Eleventh—the issue
would have been more properly defined as whether it
was clearly established that there is a liberty
interest in remaining outside the walls of
institutional confinement.
Judge Keith, dissenting, considered analogous
precedent from other circuits sufficient to proclaim
the law clearly established. By taking into account a
broader array of precedent, Judge Keith reached the
opposite conclusion from the panel majority. (Keith,
J., dissenting). He highlighted the majority’s error
when he explained that the majority’s holding
“allows an officer to blatantly violate the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights of an
American citizen—so long as it was done in a
manner that neither [the Sixth Circuit] nor the
Supreme Court has directly opined on before—with
impunity.” App. 16a. (Keith, J., dissenting).
This case highlights the inconsistent application
of qualified immunity’s “clearly established” analysis
between the circuits. Depending upon what judicial
authority a court will consult, and whether a court
will
consider
contextually
similar—but
not
identical—factual situations, courts arrive at utterly
opposed conclusions.
In this case, the clear
establishment of the right at issue is completely
dependent upon the analysis used. This case is thus
a particularly effective vehicle for clarifying the
standard for determining when a right is already
clearly established.
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II. THIS CASE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE
The extraordinary importance of qualified
immunity to constitutional tort litigation is
undeniable. A damages remedy against overzealous
government officials is, in many cases, the only
realistic way citizens can safeguard their
constitutional guarantees.
See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (“For people in Bivens’
shoes it is damages or nothing.”). Weighing against
that interest is the court-derived qualified immunity
doctrine, which admirably reduces frivolous lawsuits
but also reduces the deterrent effect of the damages
remedy on official decision making. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). Striking the
proper equilibrium between vindicating individual
rights and preventing interference with effective
governance is an essential judicial function, and one
that this Court has endeavored to provide for the
lower courts with sufficient clarity on an ongoing
basis.
But doctrinal uncertainty has plagued courts’
ability to consistently render the analysis, among
and within the circuits. Nearly thirty years ago, this
Court recognized that the clearly established inquiry
will turn on how specifically a court articulates the
rule at issue. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
639 (1987) (“The operation of this standard . . .
depends substantially upon the level of generality at
which the relevant legal rule is to be identified.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Fifteen years
after Anderson, in Hope v. Pelzer, this Court
provided contradictory guidance to lower courts
about how they should conduct the clearly
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established inquiry.
546 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)
(holding that a right could be generally defined,
contrary to Anderson’s holding that a right must be
specifically defined). More recently, this Court has
suggested that the appropriate level of specificity
falls somewhere between the two cases but has not
provided explicit guidance. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131
S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 198-99 (2004) (per curiam); see also Morgan
v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 373 (5th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (recognizing al-Kidd sits in tension with Hope
v. Pelzer).
Consequently, conspicuous differences in how
circuit courts are defining and applying the term
clearly established are distorting the operation of the
qualified immunity doctrine as this Court intended.
Absent this Court’s direct guidance, the qualified
immunity doctrine will remain substantially
disparate among the lower courts and continue
generating avoidable uncertainty.
1. Although the “clearly established” inquiry
appears straightforward on its face, appellate and
district courts routinely struggle when applying the
doctrine. See, e.g., Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 584
F.3d 1304, 1327 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (“Courts and litigants alike often have
difficulty analyzing whether summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity is appropriate.”); see
also Michael M. Rosen, A Qualified Defense: In
Support of the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in
Excessive Force Cases, With Some Suggestions for Its
Improvement, 35 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 139, 173
(2005) (“[T]his seemingly simple qualified immunity
standard actually contains great complexity. . . .
[T]he definition of clear establishment is as murky as
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it is crucial.”). Importantly, the approach that a
court takes in articulating and assessing whether the
law is clearly established is often outcomedeterminative. See Amelia A. Friedman, Qualified
Immunity in the Fifth Circuit: Identifying the
“Obvious” Hole in Clearly Established Law, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 1283, 1286 (2012) (explaining that broadly
defined rights tend to defeat immunity claims
whereas specifically defined rights shield more
government defendants with immunity).
In light of the “clearly established” inquiry’s
often dispositive nature, the circuits have cast rights
with varying standards, producing persistent and
pronounced instability. John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s
Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV.
851, 852 (2010); see Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of
Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the
Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U.L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (1997) (“While the qualified immunity
defense has long been recognized, its application and
administration continue to perplex courts and
provoke a substantial amount of scholarly
commentary.”). These perplexities have not subsided
over time; indeed, the fractured state of the “clearly
established” analysis has been a constant source of
the doctrine’s shortcoming. Compare, e.g., Casey v.
City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir.
2007) (“The difficult part of this inquiry is identifying
the level of generality at which the constitutional
right must be clearly established.”
(internal
quotation marks omitted)), with Gooden v. Howard
Cnty., 917 F.2d 1355, 1365 (4th Cir. 1990)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority defines
“clearly established” law at a level of generality so
broad as to discard qualified immunity. . . . [T]he
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cumulative effect of which is to leave the defense of
qualified immunity in a rubbled state.”), opinion
superseded on reh’g, 954 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1992).
Doctrinal disuniformity conspicuously manifests
itself in two important ways. First, judges within
the same circuit arrive at opposing conclusions as to
whether the law has been clearly established at the
proper level of specificity.1 Second, the circuits differ
in their willingness to look to factually analogous
cases in determining if the law has been clearly
established.2 They also differ regarding whether
1 See, e.g., Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1089 n.1

(9th Cir. 2013) (“We disagree with the dissent’s concern that we
are undertaking this constitutional inquiry at too high a level of
generality.”); Henry v. Purnell, 619 F.3d 323, 342 (4th Cir.
2010) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (criticizing the panel majority
from improperly framing the clearly established inquiry), rev’d
en banc, 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011); Green v. New Jersey State
Police, 246 F. App’x 158, 164 (3d Cir. 2007) (Garth, J.,
dissenting) (“I believe that the majority has conceived of the
right here at issue at too high [a] level of generality to be useful
in a case that presents this entirely novel fact pattern.”
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 436-37 (6th Cir. 2006)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that the grant of
qualified immunity [] is justified in this case. . . . I do not agree
with the characterization of the issue in this case.”); Medina v.
Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The dissent
therefore reads Crawford–El too broadly and fails to apply
Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the unique nature of a
qualified immunity defense.”).
2 See, e.g., Panagoulakos v. Yazzie, No. 13-2003, 2013 WL

6698134, at *5 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2013) (Holloway, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority’s holding that the officer is entitled
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they will consider case law developed in other
circuits. See Friedman, supra, at 1289-90 (collecting
cases and explaining “[t]he Second and Eleventh
Circuits limit the analysis to case law from within
each circuit. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits are
willing to consider all available decisional law. The
Fourth and Sixth Circuits only look to extra-circuit
case law in limited circumstances and as such are
practically as restrictive as the Eleventh Circuit. . . .
[T]he Fifth Circuit’s approach more closely resembles
the restrictive practice in the Fourth and Sixth
Circuit[s]”).
Simply put, federal circuits have developed
different approaches to describing and assessing
whether law is clearly established. Id. at 1284.
These variations have been the subject of significant
academic commentary and debate, especially because
definitional challenges in qualified immunity
doctrine are one of the most philosophically and
to qualified immunity for her mistake of law is contrary to our
precedents.”); Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 769 (5th Cir.
2012) (Barskdale, J., dissenting) (“To hold [that the officers are
not shielded by qualified immunity] is to turn a blind eye to the
material facts at hand (which are not disputed) and the
controlling law.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 162 (2013); Scozzari v.
Miedzianowski, 454 F. App’x 455, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2012)
(McKeague, J., dissenting) (“Not only does Owensby fail to
provide the clearly established law here, no other case in this
Circuit or the Supreme Court provides guidance on how an
officer must proceed after he has already called for emergency
medical services beyond the general admonition not to
unreasonably delay access to medical treatment in the face of a
serious need.”).
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conceptually challenging tasks routinely faced by the
federal judiciary. Circuit Judge Charles R. Wilson,
“Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments
in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000). Without further
command from this Court, lower courts will continue
to wrestle with recurring issues that muddle
qualified immunity determinations in constitutional
tort actions.
2. Non-uniform qualified immunity standards
also lead to unjust results and a sense of injustice.
The resulting effect is that lower courts conduct their
qualified immunity analysis in “an ad hoc manner,
giving the entire process a rather arbitrary feel.”
Michael S. Catlett, Clearly Not Established:
Decisional Law and the Qualified Immunity
Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1035-36 (2005).
Though “[t]he resolution of immunity questions
inherently requires a balance between the evils
inevitable in any available alternative,” Harlow, 457
U.S. at 813-14, blatant differences in the protections
of constitutional rights should not be struck merely
based on geography.
Maintaining consistency across the country is
critical to ensuring the doctrine operates properly.
See, e.g., Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d
1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The difficult part of this
inquiry is identifying the level of generality at which
the
constitutional
right
must
be
clearly
established.”); Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d
447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (“To ensure that qualified
immunity serves its intended purpose, it is of
paramount import, during step two, to define
‘clearly established law’ at the proper level of
generality.”).
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In addition, the power of the “clearly established
requirement” cannot be left unstated—government
officials can violate a constitutional right and yet be
immune from liability. One commentator has found
it “disturbing” and “somewhat bizarre” that some
courts of appeals have contorted their application of
the doctrine to the point that qualified immunity will
apply unless the Supreme Court itself has held the
precise, identical conduct at issue unlawful. Karen
M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Further Developments
in the Post-Pearson Era, 27 TOURO L. REV. 243, 253
(2011). More importantly, the sense of injustice
manufactured
by
disparate
application
of
constitutional principles is problematic. This is an
especially salient consideration in the context of suits
that seek to remedy alleged constitutional violations.
Moreover, establishing that the Constitution has
been violated is itself a difficult task, and to further
erect substantial barriers to vindicating constitutional violations should not change depending on the
happenstance location of where wrongdoing
occurred. See Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified
Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 479
(2011).
Were that the case, plaintiffs (and
defendants) would have perverse incentives to
procure the most favorable substantive law through
forum shopping.
This is a realistic strategic
consideration when federal officials perform their
own duties or work with other officials involved
across multiple circuits, or when there are joint
claims against state and federal officials operating in
different locales. In other contexts, this Court has
denounced the creation of opportunities for forum
shopping. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S.
Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 581-82
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& n.7 (2013) (discussing that change of venue statute
should not create or multiply opportunities for forum
shopping).
The underlying concern about
gamesmanship applies with equal force here, and
this Court should not allow such behavior to flourish
by failing to provide a workable standard.
3. The issue is also of critical importance to the
numerous government officials who may invoke
qualified immunity as a defense to litigation.
Inconsistent standards hamper certainty and
predictability for litigants, government officials, and
the courts. They also undercut the entire function of
the clearly established prong: to provide reasonable
notice to officials regarding the permissible bounds of
their actions.
This Court has previously recognized the
important benefits of disposing unmeritorious claims
as quickly as possible. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345,
354 (2006) (noting that quick resolution of qualified
immunity claims are “essential”).
To protect
government officials against frivolous lawsuits, the
Court has sought to fashion a qualified immunity
standard that quickly disposes of such lawsuits. See
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009)
(noting that parties should not endure the costs and
delays of litigating constitutional questions if not
necessary).
Accordingly, district court orders
rejecting absolute immunity and qualified immunity
are immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Hallock, 546 U.S.
at 350.
The government has also confirmed the
importance of qualified immunity in suits against
government officials.
Recognizing the need for
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skilled litigators to defend against “complex” and
“cutting-edge questions of constitutional law,” in
Bivens cases, the Justice Department created the
Constitutional and Specialized Tort Litigation
section.3 The Section aims to “avoid[] unnecessary
discovery and the burdens and distractions on
federal officials normally associated with taking
cases against them to trial.” The Section’s existence
indicates the importance of qualified immunity to the
government as a whole and the individual federal
officials it represents.
Moreover, a lack of clarity increases the costs of
judicial decision making. When this Court removed
the mandatory nature of the two-step inquiry in
adjudicating qualified immunity, it grounded its
concerns in the fair and efficient disposition of
constitutional tort cases. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 821.
These concerns are relevant here too; without clear
standards, courts will continue to struggle with
undertaking the clearly established inquiry.
***
An essential function of federal courts is
preserving the “landmarks” of civil liberties, which
are the foundational tenets of American democracy.
Courts encounter qualified immunity in the vast
majority of civil rights cases because the doctrine,
when applicable, completely bars suit. Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). In light of its
recurrence in the vast majority of cases seeking
damages against government officials, the vexing
3 Civil Torts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/

civil/torts/cstls/t-cstl.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
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issue of what constitutes clearly established law is of
such extraordinary importance that it warrants
review by this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should
be granted and the judgment below reversed.
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6608
RICHARD ORTEGA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 3:11-cv-00429—John G. Heyburn II, District
Judge.
Argued: October 8, 2013
Decided and Filed: December 10, 2013
Before: KEITH and SUTTON, Circuit Judges;
BLACK, District Judge.*
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Brittany Sadler, WILLIAM & MARY
LAW SCHOOL, Williamsburg, Virginia, for
Appellant. J. Max Weintraub, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Federal
Appellees.
Stephen
P.
Durham,
* The Honorable Timothy S. Black, United States District Court
Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
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JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
Louisville, Kentucky, for Louisville/Jefferson County
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Tillman J. Breckenridge,
REED SMITH LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
J.
Max
Weintraub,
UNITED
STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Federal
Appellees.
Stephen
P.
Durham,
JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
Louisville, Kentucky, for Louisville/Jefferson County
Appellees.
SUTTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which BLACK, D. J., joined. KEITH, J. (pp. 10–13),
delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
SUTTON, Circuit Judge.
The United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agency mistakenly issued a detainer for
Richard Ortega.
Sent to the Louisville Metro
Department of Corrections, the detainer informed
the local prison authorities that the immigration
agency was investigating whether Ortega, then
serving a home-confinement sentence, could be
removed from the United States. Based on the
detainer, the department moved Ortega to a local
prison. Ortega, who happened to be a United States
citizen, sued, claiming due process and unreasonable
seizure violations. The defendants moved to dismiss
on qualified immunity grounds, and the district court
granted the motions. We affirm.
I.
Ortega began serving an eleven-day sentence of
home confinement for driving under the influence on

3a
March 18, 2011. Under the terms of his sentence, he
had to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times. With prior approval, he could go to work, the
doctor and church. Otherwise he had to stay at
home.
Soon after he began serving the sentence, the
corrections department received a detainer for
Ortega from federal immigration authorities. “A
detainer is a request filed . . . with the institution in
which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the
institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency
or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner
is imminent.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719
(1985). In the normal course, the immigration agency
receives notice of state and federal criminal
convictions, after which it investigates to determine
whether the individual entered the country legally.
If the individual has violated the immigration laws,
the agency usually begins removal proceedings.
Immigration agent John Cloyd issued Ortega’s
detainer after seeing his DUI conviction and after
noticing that Ortega’s name and birth date
resembled, though they did not exactly match, those
of an unlawful alien. The detainer informed the
corrections department that the immigration agency
was investigating whether Ortega entered the
country legally.
As a matter of policy, the local corrections
department incarcerates any individual with an
immigration detainer. On March 19, officers Lori
Eppler and William Skaggs took Ortega to the local
jail, where he remained until his release on March
22. The corrections department did not conduct its
own investigation of Ortega’s citizenship before
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taking him to jail. This Richard Ortega, as it turns
out, is a United States citizen, subject to Kentucky’s
drinking-and-driving laws but not subject to
deportation under federal law.
Ortega filed this lawsuit, raising a host of
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). Only two remain. Ortega claims that the
city’s officers (Eppler and Skaggs) violated his rights
against deprivations of liberty without due process
and against unreasonable seizures when they carried
out the federal detainer and that the federal
immigration agent (Cloyd) caused those violations by
issuing the detainer. The district court dismissed
both sets of claims on qualified immunity grounds.
(On appeal, Ortega occasionally references other
defendants and claims mentioned in his complaint.
As the defendants point out, Ortega has forfeited
these theories of relief because he did not develop
them. See United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d
1032, 1035–36 (6th Cir. 2004).)
II.
Ortega’s appeal implicates two old qualified
immunity questions: (1) Did the state and federal
officials violate Ortega’s constitutional rights? (2) If
so, were those rights clearly established at the time
of the transfer? See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct.
2088, 2093 (2012).
Ortega’s appeal also implicates two new
constitutional law questions: (1) Does an individual
serving a sentence through home confinement have a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause
in not being moved to a traditional prison setting?
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(2) Does that same individual have a right protected
by the Fourth Amendment in not being moved to a
traditional prison setting in the absence of probable
cause?
Before turning to these questions, it may help to
explain how detainers traditionally work and why in
the normal course they do not violate these
constitutional guarantees.
Faced with limited
resources,
federal
immigration
authorities
understandably pay attention to illegal immigrants
who break other laws.
See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t
Accountability
Office,
GAO-12-708,
Secure
Communities 6–13 (2012). Using a computer
database, they determine whether individuals
convicted of violating other local, state and federal
laws have entered the country illegally. If so, they
issue a detainer to the law enforcement authority
holding the individual, asking the institution to keep
custody of the prisoner for the agency or to let the
agency know when the prisoner is about to be
released. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7.
Federal detainers do not raise constitutional
problems in the normal course. If a local prison
keeps tabs on someone until his release, even if it
moves him from one prison setting to another, it is
difficult to see how that continued custody is any
business of the Due Process Clause or for that matter
the Fourth Amendment. See Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472 (1995). The same is true if the local prison
merely notifies federal immigration authorities
before the inmate’s release to allow them to take
custody over him at the end of his prison sentence in
order to begin removal proceedings.
What happens, however, in other settings? Say a
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State authorizes the arrest of any person, in custody
or not, subject to a federal immigration detainer. See
Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-cv-708-SEB,
2013 WL 1332158 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2013). Or say a
State refuses to release a person who has posted bail
because of an immigration detainer. See Galarza v.
Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-6815, 2012 WL 1080020 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 30, 2012). Or say a State keeps a person
serving a sentence of weekend confinement in jail
because of an immigration detainer. See Rodriguez
v. Aitken, No. 13-551-SC, 2013 WL 3337766 (N.D.
Cal. July 1, 2013). Or say, as in our case, the
individual is on home confinement, and the local
officials move him to a traditional prison setting
based on the federal detainer. In these other
settings, including most pertinently ours, the matter
is more complicated.
Due Process. When an individual violates a
criminal law and receives a sentence, he usually
cannot be heard to complain about the deprivations
of liberty that result. Although “prisoners do not
shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, . . .
lawful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at
485. That is why, when prison authorities move an
inmate from one cell to another, even to a cell with
far fewer privileges, the increased deprivation
generally does not implicate a protected liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause. “The
Constitution does not . . . guarantee that the
convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular
prison.” Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
And the Constitution does not prevent a prison
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transfer to a more restrictive setting unless the
change would work an “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
While this line of authority works against
Ortega’s claim, it does not defeat it. A transfer from
home confinement to prison confinement, it seems to
us, amounts to a sufficiently severe change in
conditions to implicate due process.
Yes, both
settings involve confinement, a reality confirmed by
the fact that Ortega must wear an electronic
monitoring device at all times, by the fact that he
must obtain permission to leave the home and may
do so only for discrete reasons and by the fact he
would be prosecuted for escape if he did not comply.
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.200(2). But the two settings of
confinement still amount to significant differences in
kind, not degree. A prison cot is not the same as a
bed, a cell not the same as a home, from every
vantage point: privacy, companionship, comfort. And
the privileges available in each are worlds apart—
from eating prison food in a cell to eating one’s own
food at home, from working in a prison job to
working in one’s current job, from attending religious
services in the prison to attending one’s own church,
from watching television with other inmates in a
common area to watching television with one’s
family and friends at home, from visiting a prison
doctor to visiting one’s own doctor. See Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 532.200(1). These marked disparities between
individual liberty in the one setting as opposed to the
other suffice to trigger due process.
What process is due will vary from setting to
setting and may well turn on the notice given to the
individual before he was allowed to serve a prison
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sentence at home. Happily for us, we need not
answer these more difficult questions today. In a
qualified immunity case, a court may reject the
constitutional claim on either of two grounds—either
because no such constitutional right existed or
because the constitutional right was not clearly
established at the time of the incident. As the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, lower courts are
free to resolve (and it is often more efficient to
resolve) qualified-immunity cases based on the
second prong—that the contours of the constitutional
right were not clearly established at the time.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Just
so here.
A clearly established constitutional violation
requires on-point, controlling authority or a “robust
consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (quotation
omitted). As of March 2011, no controlling authority
or consensus of persuasive authority established that
Ortega had a liberty interest in remaining on home
confinement.
The relevant Supreme Court precedent at the
time dealt only with traditional confinement and
probation or parole. See Young v. Harper, 520 U.S.
143, 147–53 (1997); Sandin, supra; Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82 (1973); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Ortega’s case falls
somewhere between traditional confinement and
probation/parole, and the Supreme Court has not
addressed such a case.
The Sixth Circuit has not addressed an inbetween case like Ortega’s either. The closest case,
Ganem v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
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Serv., 825 F.2d 410 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(unpublished), hurts rather than helps Ortega’s
cause. It involved a federal prisoner whose prison
classification changed because of an immigration
detainer. The court held that a “detainer which
adversely affects a prisoner’s classification and
eligibility for rehabilitative programs does not
activate a due process right.” Id. at 410. Even then,
Ganem does not speak to the question here—whether
a home confinee should be thought of as a prisoner
without a liberty interest in avoiding a transfer to
prison or as a probationer/parolee with such a liberty
interest.
In the absence of Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit
authority, Ortega points to three cases as evidence of
a “robust consensus” of persuasive authority
establishing a liberty interest in home confinement.
In one, a probationer challenged the revocation of his
probation, the first six months of which were to be
served on home confinement. Paige v. Hudson, 341
F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit (in
dicta) stated that the probationer had a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in
remaining on home confinement. Id. at 643–44. In
another, the same court dealt with the imprisonment
of a person serving a sentence that included a short
time in jail followed by home confinement. See
Domka v. Portage Cnty., 523 F.3d 776 (7th Cir.
2008). There the court stated (again in dicta) that
Paige was not “necessarily controlling” because
“Domka was not a probationer but instead a prisoner
serving his time outside the jail.” Id. In the third
case, a group of prisoners released into home
confinement challenged their reimprisonment.
Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir.
2010). The First Circuit concluded (here too in dicta)
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that home confinement sufficiently resembles
probation and parole to create a protected liberty
interest in remaining on home
confinement. Id. at 890.
These three cases are neither robust in their
relevant analyses nor evidence of an on-point
consensus.
The decisions from both circuits
undermine the central premise of Ortega’s claims by
noting that today’s question—whether initial home
confinement gives rise to a protected liberty
interest—is an open one. See Gonzalez-Fuentes, 607
F.3d at 887 (“How the Due Process Clause should
apply to the liberty interests of prisoners serving
sentences in alternative forms of confinement
remains an open question.”); Domka, 523 F.3d at 781
(describing the “law in a case such as this, where the
convict is not technically ‘imprisoned,’ [as] still
evolving”). True, both courts concluded that a person
released from prison into home confinement has a
protected liberty interest in remaining on home
confinement. But Ortega’s case is different, since he
can “appropriately be characterized as a prisoner
serving a portion of his confinement in a different
location from prison.” Domka, 523 F.3d at 781 & n.3.
That difference explains why the Seventh Circuit
suggested that someone in Ortega’s position might
not have a protected liberty interest in remaining on
home confinement. See id. The officers could have
reasonably thought the same thing, meaning their
actions at worst reflected a “reasonable but mistaken
judgment[] about [an] open legal question[].” AlKidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085. The point of qualified
immunity is to protect just such judgments.
Fourth Amendment.
A similar problem
undermines Ortega’s Fourth Amendment claim—
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namely, no relevant authority existed at the time of
the incident. A Fourth Amendment seizure requires
“a governmental termination of freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied.”
Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989).
As of March 2011, no controlling authority
established that moving a convict from home
confinement to prison confinement resulted in a new
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
The few cases to discuss seizure claims by those
already confined suggest that the “freedom of
movement” and “protected liberty interest” inquiries
overlap. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449
(9th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff had no protected
liberty interest in not being confined in the SHU, he
fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim.”); Leslie v.
Doyle, 125 F.3d 1132, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We
see no reason . . . why a prisoner’s liberty interest
under [the Search and Seizure and Due Process
Clauses] would differ.”). The open question raised by
Ortega’s due process claim thus spills over into this
claim: Should a home confinee be thought of as a
prisoner without freedom of movement or as a
probationer/parolee with freedom of movement?
This open question requires a conclusion that
“the contours of [a home confinee’s right against
unreasonable seizures was not] sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that [a
transfer from home confinement to jail] violates that
right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987). The individual defendants reasonably could
have thought that transferring Ortega to jail would
not terminate his “freedom of movement” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because home
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confinement serves as an off-the-premises jail. Just
as qualified immunity applies to Ortega’s due
process claim, it thus also applies to his illegalseizure claim.
The dissent agrees with our first assessment
(that, for purposes of due process and unreasonable
seizure protections, home confinement differs
materially from in-prison confinement) but not with
our second (that the right was not clearly established
at the time of the relevant events). Because qualified
immunity protects all but “the plainly incompetent,”
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), because,
as the dissent’s own cases reveal, no appellate court
holdings had addressed this issue at the time of the
detainer, and because no material fact disputes cloud
these explanations, the district court properly
granted qualified immunity to the defendants.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm.
DISSENT
DAMON J. KEITH, dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s view that
Ortega did not have a “clearly established” liberty
interest in home confinement, I respectfully dissent.
I address Ortega’s claims against the Louisville
Metro
Department
of
Corrections
(“Metro
Defendants”) and Immigration agent John Cloyd
(“Cloyd”) separately.
Metro Defendants
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The facts of this case are such that the
unlawfulness of Metro Defendants’ conduct is readily
apparent, even in the absence of clarifying case law.
Metro Defendants seized Ortega, an American-born,
United States citizen, from his home and took him to
jail for four days, based upon an improper detainer,
without a warrant or any semblance of process. In
doing so, Metro Defendants did not allow him to
produce any documentation that he was an American
citizen. As this Court has recently explained:
“[O]utrageous conduct will obviously be
unconstitutional”
without
regard
to
precedent because “the easiest cases don’t
even arise.” Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377, 129 S.Ct.
2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted).
And
even in cases involving less than outrageous
conduct, “officials can still be on notice that
their conduct violates established law in
novel factual circumstances.” Id. at 377–78,
129 S.Ct. 2633 (ellipses and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 684 (6th
Cir. 2013).
Not only should the officers have known that
removing someone from their home and taking them
to jail requires a certain minimum level of process,
but in my view, the relevant case law clearly
establishes that criminal defendants have a
constitutional due process right to remain in home
confinement.
Confinement in the home is inherently different
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from confinement in jail. The majority concedes this
point, holding that the distinction between the two
settings of confinement amounts to a “difference[] in
kind, not degree.” Indeed, the terms of Ortega’s plea
agreement provided that Ortega would serve his
sentence through Kentucky’s Home Incarceration
Program, a creation of Kentucky law. Under the
program, Ortega was allowed to eat foods of his
choice, sleep in his own bed, report to work, and
attend religious services each day. As the majority
correctly points out, “[t]hese marked disparities
between the liberty in the one setting as opposed to
the other suffice to trigger due process.”
Nevertheless, the majority dismisses Ortega’s
claims based on the second prong of the qualified
immunity test, holding that “no controlling authority
or consensus of persuasive authority established that
Ortega had a liberty interest in remaining on home
confinement.” This conclusion is untenable. Clearly
established rights include not only those specifically
adjudicated, but also those that are established by
general applications of core constitutional principles.
See, e.g., Quigley, 707 F.3d at 685 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“That there is no federal case directly on point does
not undermine [the] conclusion [that] [t]he principle
at issue—namely, that a doctor cannot ‘consciously
expos[e a] patient to an excessive risk of serious
harm’ while providing medical treatment—is
enshrined in our case law.”).
Here, the core constitutional principle—that an
officer must provide some process before seizing an
individual from his home and taking him to jail—is
unquestionably enshrined in our case law.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court and this Court have
only explained this principle in the probation and
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parole contexts. See, e.g., Young v. Harper, 520 U.S.
143, 147-53 (1997); Sneed v. Donahue, 993 F.2d 1239,
1241 (6th Cir. 1993). Surely, however, the test for
determining whether a constitutional right was
clearly established does not require a plaintiff to
demonstrate that “the very action in question has
previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in
the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be
apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635
(1987). Indeed, in this case, the unlawfulness of
Metro Defendants’ actions clearly was apparent.
The majority’s cursory dismissal of analogous
cases from the First and Seventh Circuits, see
Gonzales-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir.
2010); Domka v. Portage Cnty., 523 F.3d 776 (7th
Cir. 2008); and Paige v. Hudson, 341 F.3d 642 (7th
Cir. 2003), as “neither robust in their relevant
analyses nor evidence of an on-point consensus”
misses the point. At a minimum, those decisions
firmly establish that an individual serving a
sentence outside of prison is entitled to some
minimum amount of process before being arrested
and taken to jail. See also Kim v. Hurston, 182 F.3d
113, 118-20 (2d Cir. 1999); Edwards v. Lockhart, 908
F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1990).1
1 We note further that in 2011, the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania evaluated the above-cited cases and decided the
precise question in this case in the affirmative, holding that
“the Fourteenth Amendment demands some minimal process
before a state actor takes someone who is set to serve his
sentence at home, on electronic monitoring, and instead puts
him in prison or another form of ‘institutional confinement.’”
McBride v. Cahoone, 820 F. Supp. 2d 623, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
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The majority’s holding allows an officer to
blatantly violate the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of an American citizen—so long
as it was done in a manner that neither this Court
nor the Supreme Court has directly opined on
before—with impunity. This cannot be the intent of
the qualified immunity doctrine.
ICE Defendant Cloyd
Although the majority fails to distinguish
between Ortega’s claims against Metro Defendants
and ICE Agent Cloyd, the facts of this case call for a
separate analysis as to each Defendant’s liability.
It is undisputed that Cloyd improperly issuance
a detainer against Ortega. It is also undisputed that
Cloyd’s actions were a proximate and but-for cause of
Ortega’s removal from home confinement and
subsequent incarceration. Having established that
Ortega had a clearly established liberty interest in
remaining in home confinement, Cloyd may be liable
for violating Ortega’s rights. See Powers v. Hamilton
Cnty. Public Defender Com’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608 (6th
Cir. 2007). Accordingly, I believe the district court’s
dismissal of Ortega’s claims against Cloyd was
improper.
A complaint may only be dismissed “if it is clear
that no violation of a clearly established
constitutional right could be found under any set of
facts that could be proven consistent with the
allegations or pleadings.” Jackson v. Schultz, 429
F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2005). In reviewing a motion
to dismiss, we “construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations
as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
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of the plaintiff.” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
Ortega alleges that Cloyd improperly issued an
immigration detainer against him, despite the fact
that he was an American-born United States citizen.
Cloyd argues that this erroneous issuance of the
detainer was due to the fact that Ortega had a
similar, but not identical name and birth date as an
individual who had previously been deported. The
district court referred to this as “an unfortunate but
honest mistake.” R. 48 at 343. But the district court
could not possibly have assessed the reasonableness
of Cloyd’s error because the detainer was not part of
the record at the motion to dismiss stage. There is
simply no way to know how similar the names and
birth dates of the two individuals were without
analyzing the detainer itself.
Moreover, even taking Cloyd’s argument on its
face, it is unclear what relationship—beyond a
shared ethnic background—Ortega had with an
individual who had already been removed from the
country. To allow ICE to issue a detainer against an
American citizen, with unlimited discretion and
without any accountability, sets a dangerous
precedent and offends any and all notions of due
process.
Because a reasonable factfinder could
conclude, after carefully evaluating the detainer,
that Cloyd intentionally and improperly issued the
detainer against Ortega, I believe dismissal was
improper.
For the foregoing reasons, I do not agree that the
claims against either of the defendants should have
been dismissed. I dissent.
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-00429-H
RICHARD ORTEGA,

PLAINTIFF

v.
JOHN T. CLOYD, AGENT IN
THE EMPLOY OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

DEFENDANTS

and,
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY
METRO GOVERNMENT
and,
MARK BOLTON, DIRECTOR
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO
CORRECTIONS
and,
WILLIAM SKAGGS AND LORI EPPLER,
OFFICERS IN THE EMPLOY OF LOUISVILLE/
JEFFERSON COUNT METRO CORRECTIONS.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Richard Ortega, brought this action
against officers and agents of United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and
Louisville Metro Corrections (“Metro Corrections”),
for alleged constitutional violations. This case has
endured several procedural twists and turns before
finally settling in federal court. The Court is now
confronted
with
unusual
and
unfortunate
circumstance which, nevertheless, yield a clear
result.
While on home incarceration, Ortega was
detained by Metro Corrections Officers based upon
the existence of an ICE detainer indicating that
Ortega was an illegal alien. As it turned out, the
information which justified the detainer was
misapplied, as Ortega is a U.S. citizen. Ortega sued
the state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal
officials under a Bivens claim.
Both sets of
Defendants have each moved separately to dismiss
based on failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be grated and qualified immunity. For judicial
economy purposes, the Court will address both
motions in this opinion. For the following reasons,
the Court will sustain the motions to dismiss.
I.
On March 18, 2011, Ortega entered a guilty plea
and was convicted in Jefferson County District Court
of Driving under the Influence, First Offense. State
District Court Judge Armstrong entered an order
immediately sentencing Ortega to eleven days of
home incarceration. The next day, on March 19,
2011, Metro Corrections Officers William Skaggs and

20a
Lori Eppler removed Ortega from his home and
placed him in jail based on an ICE-issued detainer.
The complaint alleges that ICE Agent John T. Cloyd
improperly issued the ICE detainer when he
mistakenly confused Ortega with an illegal alien that
has a very similar name and birth date. The
detainer was invalid, as Ortega is an U.S. citizen.
Ortega contends that Metro Corrections has a
“longstanding policy to incarcerate any individual
who currently had an ICE detainer on him or her.”
Consequently, Metro Correction officers detained
Ortega and he remained in jail until March 22,
2011.1
On August 25, 2011, Ortega brought this action
asserting constitutional violations pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Metro Corrections and its
officers (collectively “Metro Defendants”). He also
brought a Bivens claim against ICE and its officers
(collectively “Federal Defendants”).2 “Both Bivens
1 Defendant Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government

contends that Ortega remained in custody until March 23,
2011, the date Judge Armstrong ordered his release. The date
of release is not material and has no bearing on the Court’s
analysis.
2 Ortega initially filed suit against Federal Defendants United

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE’s
supervisory personnel Richard A. Wong and John Morton, and
Unknown Agents and Employees in the Employ of ICE. The
Federal Defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them,
based on the agency’s sovereign immunity, and the qualified
immunity of the remaining Defendants. On April 27, 2012, this
Court entered an Order dismissing Federal Defendants Morton,
Wong and United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agency from this action, but retained in the action
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and § 1983 allow a plaintiff to seek money damages
from government officials who have violated”
constitutional rights. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
609 (1999). Ortega alleged violations of the Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Metro Defendants have moved to dismiss the
claim for failure to state a claim and/or based on
qualified immunity.
The remaining Federal
Defendant, ICE Agent Cloyd, has also moved to
dismiss on the same grounds. Given the different
position of Defendants, the Court will analyze
separately whether Ortega has stated a plausible
claim for constitutional violations against each
defendant.
II.
Ortega brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Metro Defendants for violations of the
Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Due
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause. Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, “an individual may bring a private
right of action against anyone who, under color of
state law, deprives a person of rights, privileges, or
the Unknown Agent and Employees in the Employ of ICE. This
Court ordered ICE to identify all ICE Agents who were involved
in Ortega’s ICE detainer. ICE complied, naming Agent Cloyd.
Accordingly, the only Federal Defendant that remains is ICE
Agent Cloyd. With respect to Metro Corrections Defendants,
Ortega’s First Amended Complaint names Louisville/Jefferson
County Metro Government, Director of Metro Corrections Mark
Bolton in his individual capacity, and Metro Corrections
Officers Eppler and Skaggs. All Metro Defendants remain in
the action.
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immunities secured by the Constitution of conferred
by federal statute.” Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743,
749 (6th Cir. 2011). “To state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts, when
construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a
right secured by the Constitution of laws of the
United States (2) caused by a person acting under
the color of state law.” Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509
F.3d 234, 243 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations
omitted). Government officials, however, may be
immune from liability for their constitutional
violations under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Qualified
immunity is designed to shield government officials
from actions “insofar as their conduct does not
violate a clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Id. at 818. The Sixth Circuit
uses a two-step inquiry to assess qualified immunity:
“(1) whether, considering the allegations in a light
most favorable to the party injured, a constitutional
right has been violated, and (2) whether that right
was clearly established.” Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d
282, 290 (6th Cir. 2010)(internal quotations omitted).
For a constitutional right to be “clearly established,”
the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable [government official] would
understand that what he is doing violates that
right.” Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356,
366-67 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, dismissal based on
qualified immunity is proper if the official was
unaware that his or her conduct was clearly
unlawful. See Bletz, 641 F.3d at 749.
A court is permitted to consider the two-part test
in whatever order is appropriate and may begin with
the second inquiry. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
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223, 236 (2009). The Court will address each alleged
constitutional violation individually. Under each
claim, the facts and law appear to present clearly
circumstances under which the Metro Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity.
A.
First, Ortega alleges a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. Ortega argues that the Metro
Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights
when Metro Corrections Officers Eppler and Skaggs
seized Ortega, removed him from his home and
transferred him to the Metro Corrections facility.
Metro Defendants counter based on qualified
immunity by arguing that they would not have
reason to know the detainer was faulty and thus
moving Ortega from one place of confinement to
another was reasonable under the circumstances.
This Court agrees.
No evidence suggests that the Metro Defendants
had reason to believe ICE’s detainer was unlawful.
They carried out a rather routine seizure quite
unaware that the information used to generate the
detainer was misapplied.
Thus their action in
serving a detainer on Ortega and moving him from
one place of confinement to another was reasonable
under the circumstances.
Accordingly, Metro
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
B.
Next, Ortega alleges a violation of the Eighth
Amendment which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment. It is unclear which actions Ortega
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alleges constitute such a claim. Moreover, other
than a conclusory statement that the actions of
Metro Defendants amounted to “cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment,” Ortega’s complaint is scant with facts
supporting a claim for an Eighth Amendment
violation. See Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789,
795 (6th Cir. 2008)(“To move beyond the pleading
stage . . ., an inmate must allege that he has been
deprived a minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.”). Ortega’s memoranda never addresses
this constitutional violation.
Regardless, the facts in this case fall short of
supporting an Eighth Amendment violation. Ortega
was detained, albeit in a different location, for a
period of imprisonment that was no longer than the
sentence imposed by Judge Armstrong. Nothing
about the period of his confinement or the conditions
of his confinement were disproportionately harsh.
Accordingly, Ortega has failed to articulate an
Eighth Amendment violation.
C.
Ortega has alleged that Metro Defendants’
actions violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by transferring him from
home incarceration to the Metro Corrections facility
during his sentence.
The due process clause
prohibits a state from depriving a defendant of
liberty without due process of law. In the case of a
defendant lawfully convicted of a crime, “he loses a
significant interest in his liberty for the period of his
sentence.” Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th
Cir. 1991). Even assuming Ortega could establish a
liberty interest in home confinement when he has
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been so sentenced, the Court concludes that Metro
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based
on the second prong of the qualified immunity
analysis, that the right was clearly established.3 See
Colvin, 605 F.3d at 290 (“We are free to consider [the
two-part test] in whatever order is appropriate in
light of the issues before us, and therefore need not
decide whether there was a constitutional violation if
we determine that an official in [Defendant’s]
position would reasonably believe that his actions
were
not
in
contravention
of
[Plaintiff’s]
constitutional rights”)(internal quotations omitted).
The relevant inquiry in determining whether a
right is clearly established is whether it would be
clear to a reasonable agent in the defendant’s
position that his conduct was unlawful. Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004). Here, Metro
Defendants would have to be aware that in
transferring Ortega they violated his liberty interest.
Metro Defendants acted pursuant to a detainer. The
government has a significant interest in detaining
certain aliens who are flight risks while the
government’s removal decisions are pending. See
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523-25 (2003). Metro
Defendants honored the detainer and had no reason
to believe it was incorrect. It was thus reasonable for
the Metro Defendants to remove Ortega from home
incarceration based upon the policy that aliens
3 The Court need not decide whether Ortega has articulated a

cognizable liberty interest for purposes of this analysis because
qualified immunity is found based on the second prong.
Moreover, case law is varied in determining whether changes to
an inmate’s conditions of confinement implicate a liberty
interest. The Court does not intend to add to this issue.
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present a risk of evading immigration authorities. In
this situation, the Court finds Metro Defendants
could have reasonably believed that their conduct
was lawful. Accordingly, Metro Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well.
D.
Lastly, Ortega alleges Metro Defendants failed to
provide equal protection of the laws to American
citizens of Hispanic descent.
Ortega’s Second
Amendment Complaint alleges “it was [Metro]
Defendant’s long-standing policy to incarcerate any
individual who currently has an ICE detainer on him
or her.” Taking Ortega’s allegations as true, he was
not treated differently than any other person who is
subject to an ICE detainer as Metro Defendants
evidently incarcerate every individual subject to a
detainer. He was not detained due to his Hispanic
ethnicity; rather he was incarcerated because ICE
lodged a detainer on him. Ortega has failed to
plausibly allege Metro Defendants violated his right
to equal protection.
III.
Ortega brings a Bivens claim against ICE Agent
Cloyd for violating his Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights. ICE Agent Cloyd has moved to dismiss based
on Ortega’s failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted and the doctrine of qualified
immunity.
The qualified immunity analysis is
identical in suits under § 1983 and Bivens. Wilson,
526 U.S. at 609. Because the alleged constitutional
violations fail for the same reason, the Court will
address the two violations together.
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Ortega alleges that ICE Agent Cloyd issued an
invalid detainer, “causing an unreasonable seizure of
his person and a restraint of his liberty” in violation
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.4 According to
Ortega’s complaint, Agent Cloyd improperly issued
the ICE detainer as a result of another illegal alien
having a similar name and birth date as Ortega.
Qualified immunity shields government officials who
make
objectively
reasonable
mistakes
in
discretionary decisions within the scope of their
responsibilities. Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681,
687 (6th Cir. 2012).
An ICE agent could reasonably but erroneously
issue a detainer for a U.S. citizen if there is an error
in its database or if the individual’s name is similar
to someone else who is in the database. As alleged,
the illegal alien and Ortega had very similar names
and birth dates. It is entirely plausible that ICE
Agent Cloyd was unaware that he was issuing an
unlawful detainer and thus could have not known
that he violated Ortega’s “clearly established” right.
ICE Agent Cloyd was acting within the scope of his
employment when he made an unfortunate but
honest mistake and is consequently entitled to
qualified immunity. Accordingly, Ortega’s claims fail
as a matter of law.
The Court recognizes the ongoing confusion
regarding proper boundaries and communications
between
ICE
and
local
law
enforcement.
4 With respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, this Court

previously found ICE issuing a detainer caused Ortega’s
incarceration. This allowed Ortega to proceed with this Fourth
Amendment claim against ICE Agent Cloyd.
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Unfortunately, mistakes happen.
However, the
circumstances in this case do not rise to the level of
constitutional violations for which Plaintiff pursue
claims.
Being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Federal
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
SUSTAINED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Metro
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
SUSTAINED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of
Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
November 16, 2012

s/ John G. Heyburn II
John G. Heyburn II, Judge
United States District Court
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APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES CODE
TITLE 42—THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND
WELFARE
CHAPTER 21—CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER I. GENERALLY
Sec. 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
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CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 8—ALIENS AND NATIONALITY
CHAPTER I. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
SUBCHAPTER B. IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS
PART 287. FIELD OFFICERS; POWERS AND
DUTIES
Sec. 287.7 Detainer provisions under section
287(d)(3) of the Act.
(a) Detainers in general. Detainers are issued
pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the Act and this
chapter 1. Any authorized immigration officer may at
any time issue a Form I–247, Immigration Detainer–
Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or local
law enforcement agency. A detainer serves to advise
another law enforcement agency that the
Department seeks custody of an alien presently in
the custody of that agency, for the purpose of
arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a
request that such agency advise the Department,
prior to release of the alien, in order for the
Department to arrange to assume custody, in
situations when gaining immediate physical custody
is either impracticable or impossible.
(b) Authority to issue detainers. The following
officers are authorized to issue detainers:
(1) Border patrol agents, including aircraft pilots;
(2) Special agents;
(3) Deportation officers;
(4) Immigration inspectors;
(5) Adjudications officers;
(6) Immigration enforcement agents;
(7) Supervisory and managerial personnel who are
responsible for supervising the activities of those
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officers listed in this paragraph; and
(8) Immigration officers who need the authority to
issue detainers under section 287(d)(3) of the Act in
order to effectively accomplish their individual
missions and who are designated individually or as a
class, by the Commissioner of CBP, the Assistant
Secretary for ICE, or the Director of the USCIS.
(c) Availability of records. In order for the
Department to accurately determine the propriety of
issuing a detainer, serving a notice to appear, or
taking custody of an alien in accordance with this
section, the criminal justice agency requesting such
action or informing the Department of a conviction or
act that renders an alien inadmissible or removable
under any provision of law shall provide the
Department with all documentary records and
information available from the agency that
reasonably relates to the alien’s status in the United
States, or that may have an impact on conditions of
release.
(d) Temporary detention at Department request.
Upon a determination by the Department to issue a
detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a
criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain
custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48
hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays
in order to permit assumption of custody by the
Department.
(e) Financial responsibility for detention. No detainer
issued as a result of a determination made under
this chapter I shall incur any fiscal obligation on the
part of the Department, until actual assumption of
custody by the Department, except as provided in
paragraph (d) of this section.
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BALDWIN’S KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES
ANNOTATED
TITLE L—KENTUCKY PENAL CODE
CHAPTER 532—CLASSIFICATION AND
DESIGNATION OF OFFENSES; AUTHORIZED
DISPOSITION
Sec. 532.200 Definitions for KRS 532.210 to
532.250
As used in KRS 532.210 to 532.250, unless the
context otherwise requires:
(1) “Home” means the temporary or permanent
residence of a defendant consisting of the actual
living area. If more than one (1) residence or family
is located on a single piece of property, “home” does
not include the residence of any other person who is
not part of the social unit formed by the defendant’s
immediate family. A hospital, nursing care facility,
hospice, half-way house, group home, residential
treatment facility, or boarding house may serve as a
“home” under this section;
(2) “Home incarceration” means the use of a
monitoring device approved by the commissioner of
the Department of Corrections to facilitate a
prisoner’s ability to maintain gainful employment or
to participate in programs approved as a condition of
his or her incarceration, or both, using the person’s
home for purposes of confinement;
(3) “Violent felony offense” means an offense defined
in KRS 507.020 (murder), 507.030 (manslaughter in
the first degree), 508.010 (assault in the first degree),
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508.020 (assault in the second degree), 509.040
(kidnapping), 510.040 (rape in the first degree),
510.070 (sodomy in the first degree), 510.110 (sexual
abuse in the first degree), 511.020 (burglary in the
first degree), 513.020 (arson in the first degree),
513.030 (arson in the second degree), 513.040 (arson
in the third degree), 515.020 (robbery in the first
degree), 515.030 (robbery in the second degree),
520.020 (escape in the first degree), any criminal
attempt to commit the offense (KRS 506.010), or
conviction as a persistent felony offender (KRS
532.080) when the offender has a felony conviction
for any of the above-listed offenses within the five (5)
year period preceding the date of the latest
conviction;
(4) “Terminal illness” means a medically recognized
disease for which the prognosis is death within six
(6) months to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty; and
(5) “Approved monitoring device” means an
electronic device or apparatus which is capable of
recording, tracking, or transmitting information as to
the prisoner’s location or verifying the prisoner’s
presence or non-presence in the home, or both. The
devices shall be minimally intrusive. Devices shall
not be used without the prisoner’s knowledge to
record or transmit:
(a) Visual images other than the defendant’s face;
(b) Oral or wire communications or any auditory
sound other than the defendant’s voice; or
(c) Information as to the prisoner’s activities while
inside the home.
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Sec. 532.210 Petition; Study of Record; Order
(1) Any misdemeanant or a felon who has not been
convicted of, pled guilty to, or entered an Alford plea
to a violent felony offense may petition the
sentencing court for an order directing that all or a
portion of a sentence of imprisonment in the county
jail be served under conditions of home incarceration.
Such petitions may be considered and ruled upon by
the sentencing court prior to and throughout the
term of the defendant’s sentence.
(2) The sentencing judge shall study the record of all
persons petitioning for home incarceration and, in
his discretion, may:
(a) Cause additional background or character
information to be collected or reduced to writing by
the county jailer or misdemeanor supervision
department;
(b) Conduct hearings on the desirability of granting
home incarceration;
(c) Impose on the home incarceree such conditions as
are fit, including restitution;
(d) Order that all or a portion of a sentence of
imprisonment in the county jail be served under
conditions of home incarceration at whatever time or
intervals, consecutive or nonconsecutive, as the court
shall determine. The time actually spent in home
incarceration pursuant to this provision shall not
exceed six (6) months or the maximum term of
imprisonment assessed pursuant to this chapter
whichever is the shorter;
(e) Issue warrants for persons when there is reason
to believe they have violated the conditions of home
incarceration, conduct hearings on such matters, and
order reimprisonment in the county jail upon proof of
violation; and
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(f) Grant final discharge from incarceration.
(3) All home incarcerees shall execute a written
agreement with the court setting forth all of the
conditions of home incarceration. The order of home
incarceration shall incorporate that agreement and
order compliance with its terms. The order and
agreement shall be transmitted to the supervising
authority and to the appropriate jail official.
(4) Time spent in home incarceration under this
subsection shall be credited against the maximum
term of imprisonment assessed for the defendant
pursuant to this chapter.
(5) Home incarcerees shall be under the supervision
of the county jailer except in counties establishing
misdemeanor supervision departments, wherein they
shall be under the supervision of such departments.
Home incarcerees shall be subject to the decisions of
such authorities during the period of supervision.
Fees for supervision or equipment usage shall be
paid directly to the supervising authority
Sec. 523.220 Conditions of home incarceration
The conditions of home incarceration shall include
the following:
(1) The home incarceree shall be confined to his
home at all times except when:
(a) Working at approved employment or traveling
directly to and from such employment;
(b) Seeking employment;
(c) Undergoing available medical, psychiatric, or
mental health treatment or approved counseling and
after care programs;
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(d) Attending an approved educational institution or
program;
(e) Attending a regularly scheduled religious service
at a place of worship; and
(f) Participating in an approved community work
service program;
(2) Violation of subsection (1) of this section may
subject the home incarceree to prosecution under
KRS 520.030 (escape);
(3) The home incarceree shall conform to a schedule
prepared by a designated officer of the supervising
authority specifically setting forth the times when he
may be absent from the home and the locations
where he may be during those times;
(4) The home incarceree shall not commit another
offense during the period of time for which he is
subject to the conditions of home incarceration;
(5) The home incarceree shall not change the place of
home incarceration or the schedule without prior
approval of the supervising authority;
(6) The home incarceree shall maintain a telephone
or other approved monitoring device in the home or
on his person at all times;
(7) Any other reasonable conditions set by the court
or the supervising authority including:
(a) Restitution under KRS 533.030;
(b) Supervision fees under KRS 439.315; and
(c) Any of the conditions imposed on persons on
probation or conditional discharge under KRS
533.030(2);
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(8) A written and notarized consent agreement shall
be filed with the court by every adult who will share
the offender’s home during the term of home
incarceration; and
(9) Any supervision fee or other monetary condition,
except restitution, shall be paid by the defendant
directly to the person or organization specified by the
court in a written order, except that any such fees or
monetary conditions owed to the Department of
Corrections shall be paid through the circuit clerk.
Sec. 532.230 Ineligibility
No person being held under a detainer, warrant, or
process issued by some other jurisdiction shall be
eligible for home incarceration. No person convicted
of a violent felony offense shall be eligible for home
incarceration.

